This paper surveys the main results appeared in the literature on the computational complexity of non-monotonic inference tasks. We not only give results about the tractability/intractability of the individual problems but we also analyze sources of complexity and explain intuitively the nature of easy/hard cases. We focus mainly on non-monotonic formalisms, like default logic, autoepistemic logic, circumscription, closed-world reasoning and abduction, whose relations with logic programming are clear and well studied. Complexity as well as recursion-theoretic results are surveyed.
Introduction
Non-monotonic logics and negation as failure in logic programming have been de ned with the goal of providing formal tools for the representation of default information. One of the ideas underlying both areas is that the use of default assumptions should lead to a more compact representation of knowledge. As a consequence, non-monotonic knowledge bases should be more space-e ective than ordinary ones and this may hopefully have an impact on the performances of theorem provers.
This expectation generated an interesting activity in the development of algorithms for reasoning under non-monotonicity, as well as many studies about the inherent complexity of the inference tasks.
The goal of this paper is to survey the main results appeared in the literature on the computational complexity of non-monotonic inference tasks. We not only give results about the tractability/intractability of the individual problems but we also analyze sources of complexity and explain intuitively the nature of easy/hard cases. Furthermore, we create an extensive list of references to the literature that, in our opinion, will provide an useful tool for researchers interested in designing algorithms for non-monotonic reasoning (NMR in the sequel).
We focus mainly on non-monotonic formalisms, like default logic, autoepistemic logic, circumscription, closed-world reasoning and abduction, whose relations with logic programming are clear and well studied. Other reasoning problems, like reasoning on inheritance networks or belief revision are only brie y mentioned.
We refer the reader to works like 39, 89] for extensive surveys on NMR and to 123] for a survey on the relations between NMR and logic programming. Works on NMR that survey complexity results have been done by Minker 103] and Schlipf 139] .
Many results that have appeared in the literature are concerned with decidable fragments of non-monotonic logics. In the spirit of a well-established trend in knowledge representation 20] , they aim at the characterization of the expressive power of languages having polynomial time reasoning procedures. Other works deal with fully expressive languages and try to characterize the precise complexity of the inference task. In this paper we are interested in both kinds of results, privileging the analysis of propositional, decidable languages.
We use the jargon of computational complexity and recursion theory, as found in 54] and in 131], respectively. In particular we make use of the notions of polynomial, arithmetical and analytical hierarchies.
Using notions of higher-order complexity is necessary, since a general property of nonmonotonic inference is that its computational complexity is higher than the complexity of the underlying monotonic logic. As an example, restricting the expressiveness of the language to Horn clauses allows for polynomial inference as far as classical propositional logic is concerned 40], but the inference task becomes NP-hard when propositional default logic 150] or circumscription 26] are considered.
The fact that non-monotonicity adds complexity to reasoning was clear from the rst studies: in his seminal paper, Reiter 129] showed that inference in default logic is not r. e. The issue of determining precise lower and upper bounds was addressed later and some formalisms have been proved to be complete for precise levels of the arithmetical or analytical hierarchy 5, 25, 34, 135] . Analogous completeness results have been found for the propositional versions of the same formalisms wrt some levels of the polynomial hierarchy 41, 64] .
Part of the increase in the complexity of inference can be explained by noticing that the semantic de nitions of most non-monotonic formalisms are either based on xpoint constructions or on conditions requiring some form of minimality. This apparently gives a completely orthogonal source of complexity.
Examples of formalisms based on xpoint semantics are default 129] and autoepistemic logic 104] where deduction is performed wrt extensions or expansions, which are solutions of xpoint equations. As we see in the following sections, this xpoint construction requires an additional non-deterministic choice that cannot be polynomially reduced to a deterministic one unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses.
An example of non-monotonic formalism based on a form of minimality is circumscription 85, 98, 99] , in which inference is performed wrt the models of a rst-order formula in which the extension of some selected predicates is minimized. As it turns out, the minimality requirement gives rise to a computational overhead that is analogous to that given by the xpoint constructions.
The paper is organized as follows: after an introductory section on complexity concepts (Section 2), we rst survey the formalisms based on xpoint constructions, starting with default logic, which is presented in Section 3. The structure of reasoning in default logic makes it easy to precisely point out the various sources of complexity present in this kind of non-monotonic formalisms. We then discuss in Section 4 modal nonmonotonic logics with particular attention to autoepistemic logic. The introduction of negation in logic programming has produced a proliferation of semantics, some based on xpoint constructions (e. g. stable model semantics) and other on minimal models (e. g. well-founded semantics). Complexity results for the various semantics are surveyed in Section 5. In Section 6 we discuss non-monotonic formalisms whose semantics is based on some form of minimality, which are the di erent forms of closed-world reasoning and circumscription. In Section 7 we carry on an analysis of the complexity of the so-called logic-based abduction and, very brie y, mention results for other forms of abduction. While abduction is not strictly a formalism for NMR, nevertheless it is tightly related both to it and to logic programming. In Section 8 we discuss in some detail the various reductions between NMR problems pointing out their importance from the point of view of computational complexity analysis. Finally, in Section 9 we draw some conclusions.
Complexity classes
In this section we give a brief overview of complexity concepts that will be used throughout the paper. We refer the reader to 54, 74] for a thorough introduction in the eld of complexity.
In this paper we deal most of the times with decision problems, i. e. problems that admit a boolean answer. For decision problems the class P is the set of problems that can be answered by a Turing machine in polynomial time. Often we refer to computations done by non-deterministic Turing machines. The class of decision problems that can be solved by a non-deterministic Turing machine in polynomial time | where it is understood that the answer is yes provided at least one of the computations done in parallel by the machine ends in an accepting state | is denoted by NP. The class of problems whose answer is always the complement of those in NP, is denoted by co-NP. Also problems in co-NP can be solved by a non-deterministic Turing machine in polynomial time, but it is understood that the answer is yes provided all the computations done in parallel by the machine end in an accepting state. The class P is obviously contained both in NP and in co-NP.
An example of a problem in NP is testing satis ability of a propositional formula: a formula T is satis able i at least one truth assignment M such that M j = T exists.
An example of a problem in co-NP is testing if a propositional formula T entails a propositional formula : T j = i for all truth assignments M it holds that (M j = T) =) (M j = ). In fact propositional satis ability (entailment) is an NP-complete (co-NP-complete) problem, i. e. the \toughest" | wrt many-one polynomial reducibility | problem in the class NP (co-NP). We recall that the best algorithms known for solving NP-complete or co-NP-complete problems require exponential time in the worst case, and that the following relations are conjectured: P NP, P co-NP, NP 6 = co-NP.
In the following we refer to a particular type of computation called computation with oracles. Oracles are intuitively subroutines without cost. Given a class of decision problems C, the class P C (NP C ) is the class of decision problems that can be solved in polynomial time by a deterministic (non-deterministic) machine that uses an oracle for the problems in C, i. e. a subroutine for any problem in C that can be called several times, spending just one time-unit for each call.
The de nition of polynomial hierarchy is based on oracle computations. for all k 1. We say that a problem is at the k-th level of the polynomial hierarchy if it is p k+1 -complete under polynomial Turing reductions, i. e. it is in p k+1 and it it is either p k -hard or p k -hard. Propositional satis ability and entailment are both at the rst level. In the following we focus on problems in p 2 (=NP NP ) and p 2 (=co-NP NP ), as they are important in this paper. p 2 contains all problems solvable in non-deterministic polynomial time provided it is possible to use for free a subroutine for a problem in NP, for example propositional satis ability. The prototypical p 2 -complete problem is testing validity of a quanti ed boolean formula Q (called QBF 2;9 formula) of this kind: 9x 1 9x n 8y 1 8y m E where x 1 ; : : :; x n ; y 1 ; : : :; y m are distinct propositional letters and E is a purely propositional formula built on such letters. The formula Q is valid i there exists a truth value assignment to the propositional letters x 1 ; : : :; x n such that for each possible extension of such an assignments to the letters y 1 ; : : : ; y m , Q is true. The prototypical p 2 -complete problem is testing validity of a quanti ed boolean formula of this kind (called QBF 2;8 formula): 8x 1 8x n 9y 1 9y m E We refer the reader to 111] for examples of p 2 -complete problems.
In virtue of the conjectures p k p k+1 and p k p k+1 , p 2 -complete and p 2 -complete problems are considered more di cult to solve than both NP-complete and co-NP complete problems. A practical di erence exists between NP-complete and p 2 -complete problems. Suppose we have a good heuristic for solving an NP-complete problem (as an example propositional satis ability testing), that normally solves the problem in an acceptable amount of time | even if exponential time is needed in the worst case. It is still not immediate how to use such a good heuristic for solving e ciently a p 2 -complete problem. As a matter of fact, if the conjecture NP p 2 is true, then in the worst case an exponential number of calls to an algorithm for satis ability testing would be necessary in order to solve any p 2 -complete problem. The same holds for p 2 -complete problems. Methods such as GSAT 145] for e cient handling of NP-complete problems are therefore most likely not applicable to problems at the second level of the polynomial hierarchy. On the other hand p 2 -complete (=P NP -complete) problems are \mildly" harder than NP-complete ones, since they can be solved by means of a polynomial number of calls to an algorithm for satis ability testing.
As we shall see in the sequel, many problems in propositional non-monotonic reasoning are p 2 -complete or p 2 -complete, and many algorithms designed for solving such problems use satis ability testers as subroutines.
The last class of decision problems we introduce are those polynomially solvable by a deterministic Turing machine with no more than f(n) calls to a p k oracle. Such class is denoted by P p k f(n)] , where f(n) is a polynomial function of the size n of the problem instance. In particular we will mention in the paper the class P NP log(n)] . We notice that NP P NP log(n)] p 2 and that the containments are conjectured to be strict. Throughout this paper we assume that all the above mentioned conjectures are true. If two decision problems A and B are complete for the same class, then there is always a way to solve any instance of A by solving a single instance of B and viceversa. In Section 8 we will discuss in detail applications of this property to NMR problems.
Sometimes we refer to search problems, i. e. problems whose answer is more complex than just a boolean value. As an example, nding a satisfying truth assignment for a propositional formula is a search problem. An interesting class of search problems is F p 2 , which is the set of problems solvable in polynomial time by a machine with access to an oracle for an NP problem. If the oracle can be accessed only a logarithmic number of times, then we have the class FP NP log(n)] .
While the polynomial hierarchy is an attempt at characterizing \how polynomially uncomputable" is a decidable function, the arithmetical and analytical hierarchies | which are precursors of the polynomial hierarchy | are characterizations of \how undecidable" is a function. For the sake of brevity we do not give precise de nitions but refer the reader to 131, 70] . We just recall that the elements 0 k , 0 k , 0 k of the arithmetical hierarchy and the classes 1 k , 1 k , 1 k of the analytical hierarchy are de ned similarly to the elements of the polynomial hierarchy. While separations among the levels of the polynomial hierarchy is only conjectured, separation in both the the arithmetical and the analytical hierarchies has been formally proved. Moreover any element of the analytical hierarchy is harder than any element of the arithmetical hierarchy.
Default Logic
Default logic has been de ned by Reiter in 129] and it is one of the more extensively studied non-monotonic formalisms. Interesting relations between default logic and logic programming have been shown by Bidoit and Froidevaux in 13]. They used default logic for de ning a semantics for negation in logic programming.
In default logic the knowledge about the world is divided into two parts, representing certain knowledge and defeasible rules, respectively. The rst part (denoted with W) is a set of closed rst-order formulae, while the second one (denoted with D) is a collection of special inference rules called defaults. A default is a rule of the form The three computational problems which are most relevant in default logic, and that have been extensively studied in the literature, are: deciding whether a default theory hD; Wi has an extension, deciding whether a formula belongs to at least one extension of hD; Wi (also known as credulous default reasoning) and deciding whether belongs to all the extensions (skeptical default reasoning). Notice that these are decision problems. The set of generating defaults gives a compact representation of an extension of a closed default theory, which by de nition is a deductively closed set of formulae, hence in nite. The search problem of nding a set of generating defaults has also been studied from the computational point of view.
We Since there are (2 jDj ) subsets of D, the body of the for each loop could be executed an exponential number of times. As far as the computational cost of the body of the loop is concerned, the rst test | according to the de nition of extension given previously | requires to perform several satis ability and entailment checks for propositional formulae. Analogously, the second test requires an entailment check. As a consequence, each execution of the body of the loop requires most likely an exponential time.
If non-deterministic computations are considered, then the situation is di erent. As an example, it is possible to guess in parallel all the subsets D 0 of D, and this can be done in polynomial time by a non-deterministic machine. Clearly we want that such a machine to return true if at least one subset D 0 satis es the property in the loop. As far as the body of the loop is concerned: We saw in Section 2 that both satis ability and entailment tests can be answered by NP machines. In other words, credulous default reasoning can be done by a non-deterministic polynomial Turing machine which guesses in parallel all the possible subsets D 0 of D and, for each subset, uses the answers given by an oracle. The oracle is in charge of performing the satis ability and entailment checks required by the body of the loop, which are computations doable in non-deterministic polynomial time as well. It is clear from the de nition of extension that for each subset D 0 only a polynomial number of calls to the oracle are needed. The above argument can be made more formal and it shows that the problem of credulous default reasoning is in the class NP NP = p 2 of the polynomial hierarchy. This establishes an upper bound, but it is of obvious practical interest to know whether (at least one of) the non-deterministic polynomial computations that we were referring previously to can be turned into deterministic polynomial ones, by means of smart search techniques.
Gottlob This result can be interpreted by saying that the source of complexity of consistency checking and that of the choice of the generating defaults are independent, and their interaction gives a problem which is complete for the second level of the polynomial hierarchy. This fact formalizes, for the propositional case, the intuition that, if NP 6 = p 2 , default reasoning is computationally harder than monotonic reasoning, which is complete for the rst level of the polynomial hierarchy. It is interesting to see explicitly Gottlob's proof of p 2 -hardness, in order to understand better the sources of complexity. The proof consists in a polynomial reduction from the problem of deciding the validity of a QBF 2;9 formula. All the possible truth assignments to p 1 ; : : :; p n are in one-to-one correspondence with the extensions of hD; ;i. Hence, Q is valid i there exists at least one extension of hD; ;i containing G, i. e. if G follows from hD; ;i in a credulous way. This shows that validity of a QBF 2;9 formula can be reduced to credulous default reasoning by means of a polynomial many-one reduction.
We want to spend few words for commenting the above reduction. Extensions can be chosen in non-deterministic polynomial time (symbolized by the sequence of the existential quanti ers), but apparently not in deterministic polynomial time. An intuitive explanation of this fact is that defaults may interact in a combinatorial fashion, thus generating an exponential number of extensions. Moreover, even if a deterministic polynomial choice were possible, the complexity of the inference wrt the chosen extension should still be faced: it can be done in non-deterministic polynomial time (sequence of universal quanti ers), but apparently not in deterministic polynomial time. The above proof uses normal defaults without prerequisites. As a consequence, restricting to normal default theories does not help reducing the complexity of credulous reasoning. From the algorithmic point of view, normal default theories have been considered more promising, since they support goal-directed algorithms for credulous reasoning (see 129]), while the algorithms proposed for non-normal theories by Etherington in 50] and Zhang and Marek in 158] use exponential amount of space to avoid non-termination.
Skeptical default reasoning in the prerequisite-free normal case has been shown to be p 2 -complete with a similar proof in 64] and 151] In the same works the problem of showing the existence of an extension has been proven to be p 2 -complete for semi-normal default theories (it becomes trivial for normal default theories which are guaranteed to have extensions). Papadimitriou and Sideri prove in 113] similar results for the last problem.
Several researchers studied restrictions of the expressiveness of default theories so that inference could be done in polynomial time. In particular restricted forms of the purely propositional part (the W), like Horn clausal form, 2CNF or 1CNF, have been considered (2CNF formulae are conjunction of clauses of the form x _ y, where x; y are literals; 1CNF formulae are just conjunction of literals). Generally speaking, restricting the expressiveness of the W is not useful from the computational point of view, since the complexity of default reasoning can be completely \hidden" in the default part: the default theories hD; Wi and hD f( : =W)g; ;i are equivalent. Therefore, the expressiveness of the default part must be limited as well, so that the non-deterministic choice of the subsets of D that are to form a set of generating defaults can be turned into a deterministic one. This can be done by imposing conditions on the syntactic form of the defaults in order to control their interaction.
Let us analyze one of such restrictions that have been proposed, the so-called Horn defaults. In Horn defaults the prerequisite is a conjunction of positive atoms, the justication and the consequence are the same literal, i. e. the default has the form : y=y Kautz and Selman in 76] prove that, as long as W is 1CNF and credulous reasoning is concerned, a set of Horn defaults D can be mapped in linear time into a set of Horn clauses H so that the inference of a single literal x from hD; Wi is equivalent to the inference of x from H, hence doable in linear time in jhD; Wij. In this case clearly the interaction among the defaults is not arbitrarily complex, and can be easily controlled. As proven by Stillman in 150], the hypothesis that W is 1CNF cannot be fully relaxed, since if W is in Horn clausal form, then credulous reasoning is NP-complete.
In 76] and 150] other examples of restrictions that lead to polynomially tractable cases are shown. Kautz and Selman in 76] focus on default theories in which W is 1CNF, nding results for all three decision problems and the search problem of default reasoning. It is interesting to notice that credulous and skeptical reasoning have di erent complexity: as an example skeptical reasoning of a single literal is co-NP-complete when W is 1CNF and D is Horn.
Finding a set of defaults generating an extension has still a di erent complexity, and it is polynomial for some class in which both skeptical and credulous reasoning are intractable. Kautz and Selman for example analyze the case in which W is 1CNF and D has only disjunction free ordered defaults, which are strictly more expressive than Horn defaults. Orderedness is a property of defaults de ned by Etherington in 51], analogous to the idea of strati cation in logic programming. A disjunction-free default has the form a 1^ ^a l : b 1^ ^b m^c1^ ^c n =b 1^ ^b m ), where all a i , b j and c k are literals. Finding an extension in this case has been proven to be polynomial in 76]. This result has been improved by Papadimitriou and Sideri in 113] , who show that some form of cycles in the defaults can be allowed. In particular orderedness can be relaxed to a property that they call evenness, still having polynomiality.
It is clear that nding a set of defaults generating an extension is at least as hard as proving the existence of an extension. The last problem is shown in 76] to be NP-complete when W is 1CNF and D disjunction-free. This result is improved by Dimopoulos and Magirou in 38], in which NP-completeness is shown for disjunctionfree and prerequisite-free defaults.
Kautz and Selman give also upper bounds for the complexity of default reasoning, showing that as long as W is 1CNF and D is disjunction-free (the most general class they take into account) credulous reasoning and proving the existence of an extension are in NP, skeptical reasoning is in co-NP and nding an extension is in F p 2 , i. e. it can be done by a polynomial machine which uses an NP oracle. These results con rm the intuitive complexity analysis that we gave before: the complexity of the consistency/entailment checking is always linear in 1CNF-disjunction free default theories, hence the only source of complexity is the interaction of defaults. As a consequence, the decision problems are at the rst level of the polynomial hierarchy.
Stillman in 150] tries to enhance the expressiveness of W, by allowing either 2CNF or Horn clauses, with disjunction-free defaults. For the reasons given before, the upper bound of the four problems is not a ected by this enhancement. He focuses on prerequisite-free defaults, showing for example that if the defaults are also normal and the W is 2CNF, then credulous reasoning is polynomial, while it is NP-complete if W is in Horn clausal form.
Bidoit and Froidevaux in 13] give results that complement Stillman's ones, by showing that propositional logic programs can be translated into default theories whose W is Horn. If the program is strati ed, then the resulting default theory has a unique extension which can be computed in polynomial time. Further polynomial cases can be obtained using the similar translations by Marek and Truszczy nski in 94].
Dimopoulos and Magirou in 38] obtain further results, by using a network representation of seminormal disjunction-free default theories. Using a graph-theoretic analysis they show that for theories without odd cycles in the associated graph, nding an extension can be done in polynomial time. This class generalizes the class of disjunction-free ordered theories, thus improving the previous results in 76].
Ben-Eliyahu and Dechter in 9, 10] propose a di erent technique for performing default reasoning: translating a default theory hD; Wi into a propositional theory P so that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the models of P and the extensions of hD; Wi. As proven by the results of 64] and 151] a transformation of this kind cannot in general be done in polynomial time unless p 2 = NP. Actually the size of P, according to the transformation of 10], is exponential in the size of hD; Wi. Nevertheless, there are subcases in which the size of P is polynomial wrt the size of the default theory. The most important such case shown in 10] concerns the class of 2-default theories, in which W is 2CNF, the prerequisite of each default is in 2CNF, each justi cation is in 2DNF and the conclusion is a clause of size two. Using this reduction, Ben-Eliyahu and Dechter prove that the three decision problems are either NP-complete or co-NP-complete for this class of default theories. Furthermore, each subclass of 2-default theories that translates into a tractable subclass of propositional satis ability is a tractable subset of default logic. Two such subclasses are shown in 10].
With respect to default theories in which rst-order formulae occur, it is worth re-membering that a default of the form ( : p(x)=p(x)), where x is a variable, is actually an abbreviation for the in nite set of defaults ( : p(t)=p(t)), where t is a term of the Herbrand universe of the default theory. Apart from the results by Reiter in 129] who showed that credulous default reasoning is not r. e. , few results on the complexity of fully rst-order default reasoning have appeared. Reiter proved also that, as long as closed normal default theories built on decidable fragments of rst-order logic are concerned, decidability of credulous reasoning is guaranteed. When open defaults are considered this is no longer true: Baader and Hollunder showed in 7] that credulous default reasoning is undecidable for default theories built on a decidable fragment of rst-order logic and containing a nite number of open defaults. Apt and Blair in 5] performed an analysis on complexity of negation in logic programs, giving some results on default logic by using the existing correspondences between the two formalisms. In particular they show that skeptical and credulous inference of ground atoms is, for all nite n, hard wrt the class 0 n of the arithmetic hierarchy, hence strictly harder than rst-order inference. These results hold for nite rst-order W and for in nite D, in the sense speci ed above. In Section 5 we give more details about the results by Apt and Blair.
Marek, Nerode and Remmel in 91] give recursion-theoretic results on a non-monotonic formalism that generalizes default logic.
We now brie y mention results on variants of default logic. The complexity of modelpreference default logic introduced by Kautz and Selman in 142], has been analyzed by the same authors, Papadimitriou 112] and Cadoli 24] . The complexity of another variant, known as default logic with stationary extensions introduced by Przymusinska and Przymusinsky 120], has been analyzed by Gottlob 63] .
A computationally appealing alternative to default logic is based on the use of probabilistic semantics. For a general survey on the topic we refer the reader to Pearl's paper 116]. In this setting default rules implicitly de ne a preference ordering (ranking) among sentences that is used to infer conclusions. This di erent reading has a stronger causal content than classical default logic. Computationally, this results in a more tractable system. In fact, the problem of deciding whether a formula follows from a conditional knowledge base is in p 2 . This is due to the simpler interaction between defaults which can be accommodated using only a polynomial number of calls to a satis ability tester. As a consequence, restricting the attention to base languages where satis ability can be checked in polynomial time (e. g. Horn clauses) delivers polynomial deduction tasks (see the works of Goldszmidt and Pearl 62] ).
We would like to conclude this section by summarizing the results previously presented. Propositional default reasoning is in some formal sense strictly harder than classical propositional reasoning. Apparently it has two independent sources of complexity (selection of an appropriate set of generating defaults and consistency/entailment checks) whose interaction leads to problems complete for the second level of the polynomial hierarchy. Many successful attempts at nding polynomially tractable subcases have been proposed, and all of them attack both sources of complexity at the same time.
Algorithms for performing default reasoning have been presented by Reiter 129 
Modal Non-Monotonic Logics
In this section we review complexity results presented in the literature concerning nonmonotonic versions of modal logics, with special attention to the best known of such logics, autoepistemic logic with all its variants. We consider a propositional language augmented by the modal operator L.
Historically, the rst non-monotonic modal logic has been the Nonmonotonic Logic (NM1 in the sequel) introduced by McDermott and Doyle 101, 100] . This logic has been re ned by Moore in 104] who de ned autoepistemic logic. In autoepistemic logic the semantics of a set of modal formulae A (called premises) is given by stable expansions which are xpoints of the following equation: = f jA L :L j = g where L = fL j 2 g and :L = f:L j 6 2 g.
Stable expansions in autoepistemic logic have the same role played by extensions in default logic. Analogously to default logic, the main reasoning tasks are deciding if a set of premises has a stable expansion, if a formula belongs to at least one stable expansion of a set of premises (credulous autoepistemic reasoning) and if a formula belongs to all stable expansions of a set of premises (skeptical autoepistemic reasoning).
There is a close correlation between the interpretation of :L in autoepistemic logic and the meaning of not in logic programming, where not denotes negation as failure. This analogy has been stressed and used by Gelfond in 56] to de ne the iterative xedpoint semantics and by Gelfond and Lifschitz in 57] to de ne the stable model semantics for logic programs with negation.
An issue of obvious computational interest concerns the compact representation of stable expansions, which is analogous to the issue of a compact representation of an extension of a default theory. As shown by Konolige The complexity results for the general case are the following. The problem of deciding whether a set of premises A has a stable expansion is p 2 -complete, credulous autoepistemic reasoning is also p 2 -complete, while skeptical autoepistemic reasoning is Notice that these results are exactly the same already obtained for default logic. Since all problems complete for the same class of the polynomial hierarchy can be polynomially reduced one to the other, it is clear that, for example, credulous default reasoning where a 1 ; : : :; a n ; b 1 ; : : :; b m ; c are literals, is NP-complete while membership to all expansions is co-NP-complete. In a very recent paper Niemel a and Rintanen 109] show that restricting the attention to strati ed autoepistemic theories, a class de ned by Marek and Truszczy nski in 97] in the style of strati ed logic programs, it is possible to greatly reduce the computational complexity of all the decision problems. In particular, they show that for strati ed autoepistemic theories the only source of complexity is given by the satis ability checking in the underlying propositional language, hence, when this check can be done in polynomial time (e. g. Horn clauses) then all the decision problems are polynomially tractable.
Although there are no other direct results on the complexity of autoepistemic inference, other complexity results can be obtained by means of the techniques described in Section 8, using the translations from default logic 65, 87] and logic programs 57, 93] into autoepistemic logic.
In the rest of this section we deal with the several variants of autoepistemic logic that have been proposed in the literature.
A more complex variant is the moderately grounded autoepistemic logic introduced by Konolige in 79] . A stable expansion T is moderately grounded if and only if there is no other stable expansion T 0 such that the part of T 0 with no occurrence of L is strictly contained in that of T. This minimality requirement for T can be checked by non-deterministically selecting a T 0 and checking whether the condition holds, but this obviously adds one further level of non-determinism to the computation. Eiter and Gottlob in 46] show that it cannot be eliminated by proving that credulous reasoning wrt moderately grounded expansions is p 3 -complete and skeptical reasoning p 3 -complete.
Autoepistemic logic is a re nement of the non-monotonic logic NM1 introduced by McDermott and Doyle 101, 100]. NM1 is based on a xpoint construction slightly di erent from the one used in autoepistemic logic. Given the analogies of NM1 with As far as rst-order languages are concerned, we want to point out that in the original paper by Moore 104] only propositional languages are allowed. By the way, Konolige in 79] allows the modal operator to be applied to closed formulae of rst-order logic. Under this restriction, Niemel a proves in 108] that whenever the satis ability test in the underlying rst-order language is decidable so are all the reasoning tasks of autoepistemic logic.
Negation in Logic Programming
In this section we survey the complexity results for the various semantics for negation in logic programming. This is not intended as an overview of such semantics and their relative merits, a detailed and interesting discussion on this issue can be found in the survey paper by Bidoit 12] and in the paper by Schlipf 138] . We will only marginally refer to the huge body of literature on complexity in rule-based database languages (DATALOG), since this survey focuses on the logic programming semantics more directly related to NMR. For a survey on logic programming and databases we refer the reader to the book by Ceri, Gottlob and Tanca 30].
We survey the perfect model, stable model, default model, well-founded, supported model, positivistic, in ationary semantics and the program completion. The expressive power of the various semantics has been studied and compared extensively. For an analysis of this issue see, for example, the work of Schlipf 137] . All these semantics are extensions of the classical minimal model semantics of positive logic programs and they all agree on the class of strati ed and locally strati ed logic programs, exception made for the supported and in ationary semantics and the program completion.
Due to lack of space, this survey will necessarily be incomplete. For a more complete survey on complexity and undecidability results on logic programming we recommend the excellent paper of Schlipf 139] .
In the eld of logic programming the most important inference task is deciding whether a ground atom belongs to the (usually unique) preferred model of a program. This is the reasoning task we will be referring to in the sequel, where not otherwise speci ed.
First of all let us recall the main results on the complexity of logic programs without negation. In this case, the preferred model is the unique least Herbrand model. For propositional languages reasoning under such a model can be done in linear time using Dowling For a rst-order language, when negation is allowed there are two di erent membership problems depending on which sets of models we are interested in. Traditionally, the semantics of logic programs is given in terms of Herbrand models, however, in some works (e. g. Kunen's paper 81]) it is assumed that models are interpretations over a larger universe containing an in nite number of constants as well as function symbols. As already pointed out by Blair in 16] the second alternative leads, in general, to computationally simpler problems. Where not otherwise indicated, we implicitly deal with Herbrand models.
We now analyze the complexity of reasoning tasks in strati ed programs. From the computational point of view, these results apply to all the semantics, again with the exception of supported semantics,in ationary semantics and program completion. In this case it is well known that the unique preferred model of a strati ed program can be computed incrementally through the strata by rst assigning truth values to the atoms in the lower stratum and then moving on to the next ones 6]. This holds for locally strati ed programs as well. This procedure converges to the iterated least model as de ned by Apt, Blair and Walker in 6]. For a propositional language, this immediately implies tractability of the computation, since the computations performed at each step are polynomial and the number of strata is at most linear in the size of the program. Notice also that deciding whether a rst-order program is strati ed can be done in polynomial time 6], while deciding whether a program is locally strati ed is undecidable, as proven by Cholak in 33].
The perfect model semantics, introduced by Przymusinski in 121], uses the syntactic form of the program to infer a preferential relation on the models. The semantics is not de ned for all programs, but for a strict superset of the class of locally strati ed programs.
Apt and Blair in 5] have proven that if P is a strati ed program with n strata, then deciding membership in the perfect model of P is 0 n . Furthermore, for each n 1 there is a strati ed program P with n strata for which the same problem is 0 n -complete. This result can be specialized to the case of recursion-free programs, in which the problem is r. e. The more general class of locally strati ed programs turns out to be computationally more complex. In fact, membership is 1 1 -complete over ! as shown by Cholak and For general propositional programs, Eiter and Gottlob prove in 42] that deciding whether a perfect model exists is co-NP-hard while deciding whether a model of a program is perfect is co-NP-complete.
The stable model and default model semantics have been independently introduced by Gelfond and Lifschitz in 57] and Bidoit and Froidevaux in 13]. While the rst one is based on autoepistemic logic, the second one is based on default logic. As it turned out, these two semantics are equivalent. Since for strati ed programs they also coincide with the perfect model semantics, we only consider general programs. Three problems have been analyzed in the propositional case: deciding the existence of a stable model has been proven NP-complete by Marek When a rst-order language is used, the computational di erences between stable and well-founded model semantics disappear. In fact the problem of deciding membership in all stable (well-founded) models turns out to be 1 1 -complete over ! for both Herbrand models and models over larger universes, as shown by Schlipf in 137, 139] and van Gelder 153] . Two other problems have been considered by Marek, Nerode and Remmel.
In 91] they show that for the class of programs admitting a unique stable model the membership problem is still 1 1 -complete over !, while in 90] they prove that deciding whether a program has a stable model is a 1 1 -complete problem over !. Furthermore, Marek and Subrahmanian show in 93] that deciding whether a model is a stable model of a program P is 0 2 -hard and is in 0 3 .
As far as the predicate completion de ned by Clark 35] is concerned, for propositional languages it has been proven by Kolaitis and Papadimitriou in 78] that deciding whether a ground atom belongs to the completion of a program is a co-NP-complete problem. If quanti cation and function symbols are introduced, then the membership problem over Herbrand models is 1 1 -complete over ! and over models with larger universes is r. e.-complete.
We do not have the space to refer all the complexity results in the DATALOG area, but we still want to mention the works of Kolaitis and Papadimitriou 78] and Papadimitriou and Yannakakis 114] . In their analysis Kolaitis and Papadimitriou take into account DATALOG : programs, that is DATALOG programs with negation and with a nite universe, and give two semantics for it. The rst one is given as the xpoint of a natural consequence operator. The data-complexity, i. e. complexity wrt a xed extensional database, of nding a xpoint is NP-complete and nding a least xpoint is in p 2 (for a more precise characterization see 78]). In order to overcome these computational limitations Kolaitis and Papadimitriou introduce the in ationary semantics, which is based on an iterative construction rather than a xpoint one. In ationary semantics, as the well-founded semantics, is de ned for all programs and its data-complexity is polynomial.
This analysis has been further developed by Papadimitriou and Yannakakis. The main issue addressed in the paper is to nd a semantics whose data complexity is polynomial and which extends the well-founded semantics. The proposed semantics, the tie-breaking semantics is in some provable sense more general than the well-founded semantics and can be computed in polynomial time. In the same paper they also show that proving whether a xpoint model exists for any extension of the EDB is undecidable.
An extension of logic programming which has been well analyzed from the computational point of view is disjunctive logic programming, where disjunctions of literals are allowed in the head of the rules. For a comprehensive survey of the semantical and computational aspects of disjunctive logic programming we refer to the book by Lobo, Minker and Rajasekar 88] . Due to lack of space we can only brie y mention the major results and give pointers to the literature. Most of the semantics for negation in logic programs have been extended to deal with disjunctive logic programs. In particular, Przymusinski in 124] introduces the disjunctive stable model semantics, which extends the stable model semantics, and the partial disjunctive stable model semantics which extends the well-founded semantics. Eiter and Gottlob in 42] have analyzed the complexity of these and other semantics. In particular they show that deciding whether a literal is true in all the preferred models of a disjunctive logic program under the perfect model semantics and the (partial) disjunctive stable model semantics is a p 2 -complete problem. A di erent extension of the stable model semantics has been given by Gelfond and Lifschitz in 58] through the notion of answer set. While inference has been shown to be a problem complete for the second level of the polynomial hierarchy, see Eiter and Gottlob 44] , nevertheless some classes have been shown to be computationally simpler by Ben-Eliyahu and Dechter in 11], where they show a polynomial mapping from a subclass of disjunctive logic programs into a propositional theory. Another semantics, called disjunctive database rule has been de ned by Ross and Topor in 132] and it has been shown to be polynomially tractable by Chan 31] . Chan has also extended this rule to the possible worlds semantics which correctly handles negative clauses. However, literal inference under this new semantics is co-NP-complete 31, 42]. CWA(T) = T f:pj T 6 j = pg (2) where p is a ground atom. This rule has been re ned by several authors: Minker 102] ECWA(T; P; Q; Z) = T f:Kj 6 9B: (T 6 j = B)^(T j = K _ B)g (3) where hP; Q; Zi is a partition of the predicate symbols of T in minimized/ xed/varying ones, K is any formula not involving letters from Z and B is a disjunction of ground literals whose predicate symbols come from Q and positive ground literals whose predicate symbols come from P. The formulae K whose negations are added to T in the above formula are called free for negation.
Relationships between circumscription, closed-world reasoning and Clark's 35] negation as failure rule have been very well studied in the literature by many researchers, see for example Reiter 130] , Sheperdson 146] , Lifschitz 84] , and in all the works de ning closed-world rules. In particular it has been shown that an abstract notion of minimality underlies de nitions (1), (2) and (3). In the propositional case, formulae (1) and (3) 
Inference
Several computational tasks for circumscription and closed-world reasoning have been addressed from the point of view of the complexity. Inference, i. e. to decide whether a rst-order formula logically follows from formulae (1) or (3), is the rst one we survey.
Circumscription is a second-order formula, and second-order logic is well-known to be computationally strictly harder than rst-order logic (see for example van Benthem and Doets in 152]). In fact circumscription appears to be more expressive than rstorder logic as noticed by Lifschitz. In 84] he shows that second-order formulae like transitive closure, which are not collapsible to rst-order ones, are expressible as the circumscription of a rst order formula. This fact doesn't per se show that circumscription is strictly harder than rst-order logic. Nevertheless there have been many attempts at nding classes of rst-order formulae whose circumscription is (equivalent to) a rst-order formula. From the computational point of view, results of this kind show classes of circumscription in which inference is a r. e. problem.
One of these classes (called of separable formulae) has been de ned by Lifschitz in 85]. The class of separable formulae is based on a generalization of the idea of predicate completion by Clark 35] and contains all quanti er-free formulae. This result has been improved by Rabinov in 125] , who showed a class of collapsible formulae that subsumes separable formulae. In both cases collapsibility is guaranteed only when there are no varying predicates, i. e. Z = ;. Kolaitis and Papadimitriou 77] investigated the fragment of existentially quanti ed formulae, showing that their circumscription is rst-order even if varying predicates are allowed.
All the conditions that imply collapsibility are su cient and not necessary, and the complexity of deciding whether a given formula is in one of the above collapsible cases is in general not known. Actually, the task of proving collapsibility has been proven to be undecidable by Krishnaprasad 80] for general rst-order formulae, and by Kolaitis and Papadimitriou for logic programs 77].
All the above results seem to suggest that circumscriptive inference is harder than rst-order inference. Actually, Cadoli, Eiter and Gottlob proved in 25] that inference of a formula from a circumscription is as hard as testing validity of any formula in second-order logic.
It is interesting to notice that the last result holds even when is propositional, regardless of the presence of varying and/or xed predicates. The fact that xed predicates do not contribute to the complexity of circumscription was proved by de Kleer and Konolige in 37]. On the other hand the fact that varying predicates don't a ect the complexity may seem surprising, in view of the fact that the algorithms for circumscription that have been proposed (for example Przymusinski's in 122]) are more e cient when varying predicates are not allowed. In the following we will see that the presence of xed/varying predicates may a ect the complexity of inference for some restricted class of formulae.
Other interesting results have been obtained by Schlipf in 135] , who focused on countably in nite models of the formula (1). In particular he shows that, when inference is restricted to such models, then the problem of deciding whether a rst-order formula follows from (1) is complete for the class 1 2 of the analytical hierarchy over the integers.
It is interesting to notice that this result holds even if Z = ;.
In 5] Apt and Blair showed a lower bound of 0 n -hardness for any nite n when ground inference in strati ed logic programs is concerned. They take into account a slightly more general version of the formula (1) called prioritized circumscription de ned by Lifschitz in 85].
As far as the propositional version of (1) is concerned, Eiter and Gottlob showed in 41] that the inference problem (with Q = ;, Z = ; or not) is complete for the class p 2 of the polynomial hierarchy. In 42] they give a more tight result, showing that p 2 -completeness holds even if formulae T with no negative clauses are considered. Comparing this result to those in Section 3, we can say that the minimality requirement imposed by circumscription gives a further level of non-determinism which is analogous to the choice of the right set of defaults. As a consequence a propositional circumscriptive reasoner and a propositional skeptical default reasoner have exactly the same computational power. In Section 8 we see that many researchers attempted at nding analogous relations between the two formalisms.
Papalaskari and Weinstein 115] analyzed the in nitary propositional (sentential) case of circumscription. They showed that when the underlying propositional language is countable and there are neither xed nor varying predicates, then inference is a problem in 0 2 and not in 0 2 . It is worth recalling that inference in sentential logic is r. e.
Cadoli and Lenzerini in 26] studied the complexity of circumscriptive inference for eight classes of ( nite) propositional formulae in which monotonic inference is polynomial. In such a case the upper bound for inference is co-NP.
When the inferred formula is a clause, then the problem is co-NP-complete for very restricted cases, for example when T is both Horn and 2CNF or when T is 2CNF and only positive literals occur in it. The only polynomial case found is when T is Horn, 2CNF and with no clauses of the form :x _ :y. Further polynomial cases have been found for restricted versions of the inference problem, for example when T is Horn and Q = ;, or when T is 2CNF, is a literal and Z = ;.
It is interesting to notice that, while for the general propositional case clause inference is not any harder than literal inference, and xed/varying letters propositional letters do not add complexity to inference, this is not the case for restricted cases. As an example, Cadoli and Lenzerini show several cases in which literal inference is polynomial and clause inference is co-NP-complete. A similar tradeo exists when either Q = emptyset or Z = ;.
One source of complexity of circumscriptive inference seems to be the number of free for negation formulae in (3), which is potentially exponential. Actually, in all the polynomial cases found in 26], it has been shown that only a polynomial number of free for negation formulae has to be taken into account.
Given the equivalence of circumscription and extended closed world reasoning in the propositional case, the same results hold for the extended CWA as well. For what concerns other forms of closed-world inference, Cadoli and Lenzerini show in the same work that many intractable cases for the extended CWA are tractable for other de nitions. As an example, careful closed-world reasoning (de ned in 59]) is polynomial for 2CNF Weak generalized CWA has also been studied by Chan in 31], who proved that literal inference is polynomial for propositional formulae with no negative clauses. This has also been noticed by Cadoli 
Satis ability
Satis ability is another computational task that has been addressed. It is well-known that both the circumscription of a rst-order formula T and its closure (2) could be unsatis able even if T is satis able. On the other hand the extended closure preserves consistency.
Schlipf proved in 135] that deciding whether the formula (1) has a countably in nite model is 1 2 -complete over the integers.
Eiter and Gottlob in 41] proved a lower bound of NP-hardness and an upper bound of P NP O(logn)] for consistency checking of the CWA of an arbitrary propositional formula.
These results complement some other by Schlipf, who proved in 136] that consistency checking of a slightly di erent version of the CWA is both NP-hard and co-NP-hard and is in p 2 .
6.3 Model Checking Kolaitis and Papadimitriou in 77] noticed that the complexity of circumscription seems to arise even in the problem of model checking. Model checking is the problem of deciding whether a nite structure satis es a given formula . If is rst-order, then the task is polynomial. On the other hand in 77] it is shown that when is the formula (1) then the task is co-NP-complete. The result holds when T is a universal-existential rst-order sentence and Z 6 = ;. co-NP is actually the upper bound for the model checking of the circumscription of all rst-order formulae T. Cadoli in 23] strengthens this result in several directions, by proving co-NP-hardness of model checking when the formula T to be circumscribed is propositional, satis able, and Q = Z = ;. co-NP-hardness in the case Z = ; is implicit in the work by Schlipf 136] .
In the same work 23] Cadoli shows several polynomial subcases, for example when T is a Horn or 2CNF propositional formula. The complexity analysis has been carried out by examining subcases in which Q and/or Z are the empty set. In some interesting cases the task is polynomial if Q = ; and co-NP-complete otherwise. Some polynomial cases are also shown by Eiter and Gottlob in 41] .
It is interesting to notice that propositional circumscription is in co-NP if model checking is polynomial (see 26]).
Polynomiality of the task when T is a rst-order logic program has been shown by Kolaitis and Papadimitriou in 77].
Model Finding
Papadimitriou in 112] addressed the issue of nding a satisfying truth assignment for the formula (1) when T is propositional. Notice that model nding is a search problem.
The upper bound of the analogous task for plain propositional logic is F p 2 , hence a polynomial number of calls to an NP oracle is su cient. Gottlob and Ferm uller prove in 66] that unless P=NP a logarithmic number of calls to an oracle in NP is necessary.
Papadimitriou proves that, if minimal satisfying truth assignments are searched, then a polynomial number of calls is still su cient. 
Abduction
Abduction is the process of nding explanations for observations in a given theory. This abstract characterization has led to several di erent de nitions of abduction in the literature, which can be roughly divided into two main areas: logic-based abduction as de ned by Selman and Levesque in 144] and set-covering methods as de ned by Reggia, Nau and Wang in 127]. Although the two methods look formally di erent, strong connections have been pointed out by Bylander in 21] and by Friedrich, Gottlob and Nejdl in 53] . In this paper we focus on logic-based abduction, since it has been shown to be tightly related to negation in logic programming (see for example Eshghi and Kowalski 49] and Kakas and Mancarella 75] ) and default logic (see 144] ). Furthermore, we only consider propositional languages, since very little is known about rst-order abduction.
Logic-based abduction has been de ned as follows in 144]: Given a set of propositional clauses and a letter q, an explanation for q is a set of literals such that (1) j = q, (2) is consistent and (3) is minimal wrt set inclusion. Notice that a trivial explanation satisfying the above requirements is q itself. All explanations not containing q will be called non trivial. A condition sometimes imposed on explanations is that the set must be a subset of a prede ned set of literals A which represent the plausible hypotheses. Explanations satisfying this condition are called assumption-based explanations in 144] .
There are at least three decision tasks which have been considered in the various works on abduction: deciding whether an explanation exists at all, deciding whether an individual hypothesis h 2 A belongs to at least one acceptable explanation (credulous abductive reasoning) and deciding whether an individual hypothesis h 2 A belongs to all the acceptable explanations (skeptical abductive reasoning). The search problem of nding one (best) explanation has also been studied. The most comprehensive work on the complexity of logic-based abduction has been done by Eiter and Gottlob 47] . In this paper, they analyze the complexity of all the above problems under di erent preference criteria. In particular they show that when no restrictions are imposed on the syntactic form of the theory and no preference criteria is speci ed, then all the problems are complete for the second level of the polynomial hierarchy. Adding the requirement of minimality wrt set inclusion does not change the complexity, while using other preference criteria such as minimum cardinality and minimum cardinality with priorities the problems are p 3 -complete. Finally, for minimality wrt set containment with priorities and in the general case of an arbitrary (polynomial) ordering of the explanations, the problems are complete for the third level of the polynomial hierarchy.
This complexity can be reduced of exactly one level if we restrict to theories composed of Horn clauses. A further reduction is sometimes obtained if we restrict to de nite Horn clauses.
Under the Horn clause restriction, Selman and Levesque have proven in 144] that a non-trivial explanation can be found in polynomial time. They also prove that nding an assumption-based explanation is instead an NP-hard problem, thus showing that the restriction to a subset of the literals may a ect the complexity of inference. A similar phenomenon has been noticed for propositional circumscription with and without varying predicates (see Section 6). Bylander in 21] has focused on the more restricted case in which is a conjunction of de nite clauses, showing a polynomial method for nding assumption-based explanations. Another polynomial subcase has been found by Eshghi in 48].
As far as Horn clauses are concerned, Selman and Levesque showed that nding an explanation, with the additional constraint that it has to contain a prede ned letter q, is NP-hard. Friedrich, Gottlob and Nejdl in 53] address problems of skeptical and credulous abductive reasoning in de nite Horn clauses, proving that deciding whether a letter belongs to at least one assumption-based explanation is NP-complete, while the set of letters belonging to all the assumption-based explanations can be computed in polynomial time.
The complexity of enumeration problems has also been addressed for abduction. The number of explanations can clearly be exponential wrt the size of , and actually Bylander has proven in 21] that determining the number of assumption-based explanations for de nite clauses is complete wrt the class #P (see 74] In particular Rutenburg analyzes several de nitions of TMS's, considering problems like deciding whether there exists a nogood with size less than a prede ned number k. He shows problems whose complexity ranges from polynomial to p 2 -complete. These results con rm the intuition that many computational tasks of non-monotonic reasoning hide two independent sources of complexity, whose interaction leads to problems complete for the second level of the polynomial hierarchy.
Other forms of abduction have been presented in the literature, but they are less related to NMR, and for this reason we will not survey them here. However it is worth mentioning the work of Bylander et al. in 1, 21, 22] , who take into account a very general de nition of abduction which subsumes that of 144], proving many interesting polynomial as well as NP-hardness results.
Polynomial Reductions between NMR Problems
Most non-monotonic formalisms have been presented and motivated independently. Nevertheless there have been several attempts at relating them and at nding suitable translations from one logic into another. The existence of these reductions is not only important for a better semantical understanding of the various logics, but it is also useful from the point of view of the complexity analysis.
We focus on polynomial transformations, but recursive non-polynomial, translations can be used in the same spirit for obtaining new decidability/undecidability results. Actually, every polynomial mapping from one formalism into another can be used for obtaining new complexity results on both formalisms. We would like to illustrate this point by means of a couple of examples, using a well-known translation from circumscriptive into default reasoning proposed by Etherington in 50].
Let W be a propositional formula on the alphabet L and hP; Zi a partition of L.
Let D be the following set of default rules: D = f(: :p=:p) j p 2 Pg and the default theory hD; Wi. Etherington 50, Theorem 8.3] shows that inference in CIRC(W; P; Z) and are closely related. Actually, for any formula built with the variables of L, CIRC(W; P; Z) j = if and only if follows skeptically from (i. e. in every extension of) . In the jargon of 150], the default rules of D are called prerequisite-free normal unary (PFNU).
The above result is clearly a translation that can be computed in polynomial time, and proves that skeptical default reasoning is at least computationally as hard as circumscriptive inference, since the latter can be simulated by the former. The translation can be used along with a result by Cadoli and Lenzerini in 26] for obtaining a lower bound on the complexity of skeptical default reasoning for a restricted language. In 26] it is shown that when W is 2CNF with no occurrence of negative literals and is a literal, then determining whether CIRC(W; P; Z) j = holds is a co-NP-complete problem. Using Etherington's translation, we have the following new complexity result: Theorem 1 Let W be a 2CNF formula with no occurrence of negative literals, D a set of PFNU default rules, and l any literal. Then determining if l is true in all the extensions of the default theory hD; Wi is a co-NP-hard problem.
Theorem 1 can be interestingly compared to a result by Stillman 150, Theorem 2], stating that if W is a 2CNF formula, D is a set of prerequisite free normal default rules (superset of PFNU), and l is a literal, then the problem of determining whether l is true in at least one extension of hD; Wi (credulous inference) can be solved in polynomial time. This con rms a previous result by Kautz and Selman, discussed in Section 3, which shows that in languages of limited expressiveness credulous and skeptical default reasoning may have di erent complexity.
We have just seen how a polynomial reduction can be used for obtaining new intractability results on the complexity of non-monotonic inference. More formally, if we have a polynomial transformation from a decision problem A into a decision problem B and we have a lower bound (e. g. co-NP-hardness) on the complexity of A, then we can prove the same lower bound for B by means of a many-one reduction.
In fact polynomial transformations can be used for obtaining polynomial results as well. As an example the result by Etherington can be read also in the following way: if we had a polynomial algorithm for skeptical reasoning with PFNU defaults, then we could use that algorithm along with the transformation for performing circumscriptive inference in polynomial time.
Actually Kautz and Selman in 76] show that, if W is a 1CNF formula, D is a set of normal unary default rules (superset of PFNU) and l is a literal, then the problem of determining whether l is true in every extension of hD; Wi can be solved in polynomial time. Following the previous argument, we have the following result:
Theorem 2 Let W be a 1CNF formula on the alphabet L, hP; Zi a partition of L, and l any literal. The problem of determining if CIRC(W; P; Z) j = l is polynomial.
Although Theorem 2 is implied by a result by Cadoli and Lenzerini 26, Theorem 7], the above construction gives the avor of the kind of results that can be obtained.
In 27] Cadoli and Lenzerini show a generalization of the reduction by Etherington which allows for xed predicates is shown. By using this reduction and the complexity results surveyed in Sections 3 and 6, they obtain new complexity results both on default reasoning and on circumscription
The above analysis shows that polynomial translations between formalisms are very important tools for designers of algorithms for non-monotonic reasoning. This kind of technique has been used for example by Gottlob in 64] for proving a lower bound for credulous reasoning in the non-monotonic modal logic N de ned by Marek and Truszczy nski in 95]. Gottlob used the polynomial embedding (de ned by Marek and Truszczy nski) of default logic into the logic N along with the fact that credulous default reasoning is p 2 -hard, for proving that credulous reasoning in N is p 2 -hard as well.
In the rest of this section we survey some of the polynomial reductions between nonmonotonic reasoning problems that have been proposed in the literature. It is worth noticing that those reductions have been studied with the primary goal of comparing semantics and expressiveness and were not intended for complexity analysis. In particular, transformations are usually required to ful ll some abstract criteria. Modularity, de ned by Imielinski in 72] in the context of translations from default logic into circumscription, is one of these criteria. Loosely speaking, a translation is modular if the introduction of new facts does not require recomputation of the whole translation from the beginning.
Grosof 69], Imielinski 72] and Etherington 50, 51] addressed the issue of translating default theories into circumscriptive ones. Transformation for some restricted classes of default theories, such as propositional semi-normal defaults without prerequisites, are shown.
Several authors have shown the relations within autoepistemic and default logic. In particular, Konolige in 79] has shown a translation from default logic into strongly grounded autoepistemic logic, while Marek and Truszczy nski in 95] have shown an embedding of default logic in the non-monotonic logic N. In a recent paper 65], Gottlob has shown a non-modular embedding of default logic into standard autoepistemic logic, also proving that no modular translation is possible. All the above translations are de ned for the whole class of propositional default theories. If we restrict our attention to prerequisite-free default theories then there is a very simple and modular translation which maps single defaults into single modal formulae. This transformation is shown by Gottlob in 65] but it is already implicit in the work of Lin and Shoham 87] . We notice that several results surveyed in Section 3 are valid for prerequisite-free default theories.
It is proven by Gelfond and Lifschitz in 57] that whenever a program has a single stable model then the corresponding set of autoepistemic premises has a single stable expansion and the two coincide in the non-modal part. As a consequence, all the reasoning tasks for the class of autoepistemic theories which are translations of strati ed logic programs can be decided in polynomial time. Other reductions from logic programs to default and autoepistemic logic have been shown by Marek and Truszczy nski in 94].
Cadoli, Eiter and Gottlob in 25] showed a polynomial transformation of any infer-ence problem relative to a circumscription with varying predicates into another inference relative to a circumscription with no varying predicates. Previous attempts at eliminating the varying predicates (see Yuan and Wang in 157] ) caused exponential growth of the underlying formula. The method in 25] can be used together with another method de ned by de Kleer and Konolige in 37] for eliminating xed predicates. Notice, however, that both methods change the syntactic form of the underlying formula, e. g. a Horn formula may be changed into a non-Horn one.
Conclusions
In this paper we surveyed complexity results for many non-monotonic formalisms. In particular, we focused on those which are more directly related to the eld of logic programming. We have seen that all forms of non-monotonicity add a new source of complexity to reasoning. In particular NMR is strictly harder than classical reasoning for rst-order languages and it is harder in the propositional case unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses at a su ciently low level. Due to the lack of space we have not been able to report on complexity results for other areas of NMR, such as belief revision, non-monotonic inheritance networks and the axiomatic approaches to NMR. Nevertheless, we want to give some pointers to the complexity results presented in the literature.
In the area of belief revision and update important results can be found in the works by Eiter 83] give some results on the computational complexity of various axiomatic systems for non-monotonic reasoning.
In all the works we have surveyed, tractability is obtained through restricting the expressive power of the language. A rather di erent approach is based on the use of procedures for approximated inference. Some results on the use of approximated inference in NMR can be found in the work by Cadoli and Schaerf 29] and Etherington and Crawford 52] . many thanks are due to all the persons who attended the 4th International Workshop on Nonmonotonic Reasoning, held in Vermont in May 1992, who encouraged us in writing this survey paper.
